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Abstract
The observed high levels of banks’ operating effi ciency, profi ts and market values in the 
years before the fi nancial crisis raise reasonable doubts about the information content 
of conventional performance measures for the accurate assessment of the effi ciency of 
banking intermediation. In this paper we estimate the productivity of individual Spanish 
banks and the industry’s productivity growth over time using the methodology of Olley and 
Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), which controls for simultaneity bias. We then 
examine the contributions of two sets of factors to productivity growth: banking practices 
that have been signalled as the proximate causes of the crisis, and technical progress in 
the industry. We obtain that more than two thirds of the estimated productivity growth in the 
years 2000-2007 is attributable to practices such as the expansion of the housing market, 
the high recourse to securitization and short-term fi nance, and the leveraging of banks’ 
balance sheets. The remaining 2.8% cumulative annual growth rate is our estimate for the 
technical progress in the industry, similar to the estimated rate in the period 1993-2000.
Keywords: productivity of banks, fi nancial stability production function, IT capital, 
simultaneity bias.
JEL classifi cation: D24, G21.
Resumen
Los elevados niveles de efi ciencia operativa, benefi cios y valoración que experimentaron los 
bancos en los años previos a la crisis suscitan dudas razonables sobre el contenido informativo 
de las medidas de desempeño convencionales en su uso para la evaluación de la efi ciencia 
en la intermediación bancaria. Este trabajo estima la productividad de los bancos españoles 
a nivel individual, basándose en la metodología de Olley e Pakes (1996) y Levinsohn y Petrin 
(2003), para corregir por el sesgo de simultaneidad. A partir de esta, estima el crecimiento 
de la productividad agregada en el sector bancario español. Asimismo, el trabajo analiza 
las contribuciones al crecimiento de la productividad de dos tipos de factores: las prácticas 
bancarias que han sido señaladas como causas directas de la crisis y el progreso técnico en 
el sector. Los resultados muestran que dos terceras partes del crecimiento estimado de la 
productividad en el período 2000-2007 son atribuibles a cambios en las prácticas bancarias, 
tales como: la expansión del mercado de la vivienda, el elevado recurso a la titulización de 
activos y a la fi nanciación a corto plazo, así como el proceso de apalancamiento en los 
balances bancarios. El restante 2,8 % se interpreta como el progreso técnico estimado para el 
sector en el período analizado, similar al estimado para el período 1993-2000.
Palabras clave: productividad de los bancos, estabilidad fi nanciera, función de producción, 
capital tecnológico, sesgo de simultaneidad.
Códigos JEL: D24, G21.
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1. Introduction 
Banks and other financial intermediaries perform the economic functions of providing 
liquidity, transferring funds from savors to investors and collecting and diffusing 
information (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Diamond, 1984; Merton, 1995; Gorton and 
Winton, 2003). These functions involve value adding activities of facilitating payments 
and managing cash, selecting and monitoring borrowers and providing advice and 
consultation services. Banks use labor, capital and other inputs to perform these 
activities and earn revenues from interest rates differentials and fees. The level of 
efficiency in performing banking intermediation activities is a key factor for economic 
development (Buera, Kaboski and Shin, 2011; Greenwood, Sanchez and Wang, 2010; 
Mehra, Piguillem and Prescott, 2011) and changes in the costs of intermediation will 
have important macroeconomic consequences for investment and growth (Bernanke, 
Gertler and Gilchrist, 1999; Hall, 2011; Christiano and Ikeda, 2011).  
In conventional competitive markets, profits are the reward for providing 
services demanded by costumers at the lowest cost. The expansion of banks’ balance 
sheets around the world and the record-high growth rates of profits and productivity 
until 2007 could have been an indicator of substantial efficiency gains in financial 
intermediation. However, the outburst of the severe financial crisis in 2007 showed that, 
at least for the case of banks, the usual indicators of performance might fail in informing 
about their “true” economic results1. Potential explanations of this paradox can be the 
existence of managerial incentives to distort reported profits (Rajan 1994), financial 
innovations for regulatory arbitrage (Achayra, Schuabl, Suarez 2011), measuring profits 
and output not adjusted for risk (Haldane, Brennan and Madouros, 2010), and business 
model innovations that change the nature of banks’ output over time (Philippon, 2012), 
such as the “originate to distribute” model, and the market-based intermediation or 
shadow banking. 
                                                
1 Haldane, Brennan and Madouros (2010) document this paradox with detail. In the UK, the resources 
labour and physical capital consumed as inputs in the financial intermediation industry, relative to labour 
and capital of the whole economy, have been decreasing since the nineties while the share of gross value 
added of the financial intermediation industry in the gross value added of the whole economy rose almost 
3 percentage points, to 8%, in 2007. According to the Banker data set, the assets of the 1000 world largest 
banks more than doubled in the period 2000-2008. During the same time period, the profits of these 
largest banks increased 150% for an average annual rate of return of 15% (around 20% of return on 
equity, twice the return in the rest of industries, for the whole banking industry in the UK, US and 
Europe). In Spain, using the EU-KLEMS data base, estimated annual cumulative productivity growth in  
the period 1999-2007 was 8% (O’Mahony and Timmer 2009).  
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In this paper, we rely on bank-level productivity estimations to quantify the 
productivity growth of the Spanish banking industry in the years before the financial 
crisis (1992-2007) and examine its determinants. The Spanish case is a good case study 
for a better understanding of why the usual measures of efficiency and profitability of 
banks may not inform about the true efficiency gains in financial intermediation. First, 
the estimated productivity growth of the country’s banking industry before the crisis 
was one of the highest among developed countries. Second, in Spain concurred what 
Diamond and Rajan (2009) consider as the proximate causes of the crisis: (i) investors 
perceived a permanent reduction in interest rates when Spain joined the Euro zone, (ii) 
there was an unprecedented expansion of the housing industry and (iii) banks financed a 
good part of the loans with wholesale financing and short-term debt. However, Spain 
has also different features from the USA and other countries in two main aspects2. First, 
securitized loans remained in the balance sheets of banks and they were subject to 
capital requirements, and, second, savings banks, with market share similar than 
commercial banks, compete in an equal basis with commercial banks. 
The estimates of the bank-level total factor productivity (from now on, 
productivity) are derived from the estimation of the banks’ production function. We 
model the production and sales of bank services at the branch level assuming a Leontief 
technology (Martín-Oliver and Salas-Fumás, 2008) with two variable inputs, labour and 
services from information technology assets (IT capital), and a quasi-fixed input (the 
physical capacity of the branch). Then, the branch-level production function is 
aggregated to obtain the bank-level production function, which is the function that we 
empirically estimate with Spanish banks data. The estimation of the technology 
parameters follows the methodology posited in Olley and Pakes (1996) and extended in 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) to control for the potential simultaneity bias between the 
unobserved productivity shock and the management decisions on input quantities in 
response to the shocks.  
Next, we explore what is behind the estimated productivity. As indicated, the 
ultimate goal is to isolate the “true” economic efficiency of the banking industry, as the 
ultimate indicator of the actual contribution of financial intermediation to economic 
growth and to macroeconomic stability. For this purpose, we isolate the factors that can 
determine the estimated productivity values due to reasons different from technical 
                                                
2 For a detailed description of the the securitization process in Spain compared with other countries, and 
of the regulatory treatment of assets’ securitized in  Spain, see Catarineu and Pérez (2008). 
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progress and economic efficiency. These factors include, on the one hand, differences in 
the operating characteristics of banks in the sample (Berger and Mester, 1997; Frei, 
Harker and Hunter, 2000) and, on the other hand, factors related with the proximate 
causes of the crisis, which will be the focus of this paper. In other words, we aim at 
exploring whether certain business decisions of banks (such as concentrating loans in 
the housing market, issuing securities and short-term debt to finance the loans, 
increasing leverage, etc) improve the short-term private performance of banks but at the 
social cost of future financial instability that became evident with the crisis.   
Our empirical results show that the productivity growth rate of the Spanish 
banking industry more than doubled during the years after the Euro, a result that is 
consistent with other productivity estimates obtained from other methodologies and 
with aggregate industry data (O’Mahony and Timmer, 2009). However, we also find 
that an important part of this productivity growth in the pre-crisis years is explained by 
business decisions that, ex-post, have been identified as drivers of the crisis (expansion 
of the housing market, securitization, short-term finance and increasing leverage). When 
removing these and other operational factors from the estimated productivity, the 
productivity residual grows at a similar rate in the years before and after the 
introduction of the Euro. In other words, we show that the high growth rates of raw 
productivity estimated for the banking industry during the years prior to the crisis were 
not an indicator of efficiency and technical progress. 
The paper is related to the long list of published papers on productivity and 
efficiency of banks3. We are the first in estimating the total factor productivity (TFP) 
from a Leontief-type production function formulated at the branch level. Most of the 
productivity estimates in banking are obtained with cost or profit functions (Kumbhakar 
and Lovell, 2000)4. This paper is also, up to our knowledge, the first one to estimate the 
production function and the productivity of banks considering IT capital as a productive 
input, what seems essential in one of the most IT-capital intensive industries. This paper 
is also one of the few (together with Bunch, Koch and Kötter, 2009 and Nakane and 
Weintraub, 2005) that corrects for simultaneity bias in the estimation of the production 
                                                
3 Some reference papers in this literature are Sealey and Lindley (1977), Berger and Humphrey (1991, 
1992, 1997), Fixler and Zieschang (1992), Berger and Mester (1997). Hughes and Mester (2008) contains 
an updated review of the literature and Berger (2007) surveys more than 100 papers on cross-country 
comparisons of banking efficiency. 
4 There have been several papers published on the measurement and determinants of productivity and 
efficiency of Spanish banks (Grifell-Tatjé and Lowell, 1996; Lozano-Vivas, 1997; Maudos, Pastor, Pérez 
and Quesada, 2002) but they all use a different methodology and explanatory variables so their results are 
not comparable with those obtained in this paper. 
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function of banks following the methodology in Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn 
and Petrin (2003).  
Our paper is also related with the growing literature interested in measuring the 
cost efficiency of financial intermediation, either through a more accurate measurement 
of the output of banks and market-based (shadow banking) intermediaries (Philippon, 
2012), or through the calculation of risk-adjusted measures of productivity (Haldane, 
Brennan and Madouros, 2010; Basu, Inklaar and Wang, 2011). Our contribution 
regarding this literature is twofold: First, we estimate the production function and the 
productivity values using bank-level data, whereas the previous papers use aggregate 
industry data for their estimations. Second, our analysis goes beyond the scope of these 
papers, obtaining a more accurate estimation of the contribution of technical progress to 
the productivity growth of the banking industry, and provides an empirical test for some 
of the theories about the causes of the financial crisis.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the production 
technology of banks and the methodology used in the estimation of productivity. 
Section 3 shows the results of the estimation of the production function and average 
productivity for the Spanish banking industry from bank-level data. Section 4 contains 
an analysis of the determinants of the observed productivity of Spanish banks, in the 
context of the banking practices that have been related with the causes behind the recent 
financial crisis. The conclusions summarize the main results of the paper. 
2. Production function estimation 
In this section, we describe the methodology proposed for the estimation of the banks’ 
production function. Relying on this, we estimate banks’ productivity. Our starting 
point is based on the empirical fact that retail banks’ services are produced at branches, 
which provide the physical space for employees, computer terminals and other physical 
infrastructure needed in the production process. If the branches of one bank are 
relatively similar, the output (inputs) of the bank can be computed as the output (inputs) 
per branch, multiplied by the number of branches. Once in the branch, customers 
receive services that are produced combining labor and IT capital inputs, being the 
branch’s capacity an indivisible and fixed input. Since bank services are not directly 
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observable and measurable5,6, we rely on the assumption that the variability across 
banks in services produced can be approximated by the sum of loans and deposits, at 
constant prices.
The production function 
The representative bank is assumed to collect deposits, D, and grant loans, L, deploying 
physical capital (branches, B), IT capital (IT) and labor (N). Since the services attached 
to these loans and deposits are provided in each branch, the inputs and outputs of banks 
are first defined at the branch level and, then, aggregated to the bank level. Each branch 
has a given capacity q. The number of workers per branch (Nb) and the IT capital per 
branch (IKb) can be substituted among themselves, but not with the physical capital. For 
a given number of branches (B), the total output of the bank defined as the sum of loans 
(L) and deposits (D) can be written as follows,  
( ){ }[ ]bb IKNFqBDL ,,min⋅=+  (1)
Therefore, the branch production technology is of the Leontief-type with a given 
investment in fixed capital that limits the total capacity of the branch. The function F( ) 
is assumed to be increasing and concave in the two variable inputs, labor and IT capital. 
Equation (1) assumes constant returns to scale at the bank level (i.e. output of the bank 
is a scale factor of the output per branch)7. If the function F( ) at the branch level is 
linear homogeneous then equation (1) can be written as,  
( ){ }[ ]IKNFqBDL ,,min ⋅=+ (2)
where N=BÂNb and IK=BÂIKb denote labor and IT inputs, at the bank level, respectively. 
We assume that the capacity q is non-binding for the standard branch, so the observed 
level of output is determined by the function F(N, IK). For the rest of the paper, the 
actual specification of the constant returns to scale production function will be written 
as, 
                                                
5 Bank services include the marketing of loans, deposits and payment services; the evaluation of the credit 
quality of the potential borrowers; the monitoring of loans and possible defaults; provision of liquidity; 
book keeping and monitoring of deposit accounts; selling and book keeping of saving products and so on. 
6 The paper adopts the production approach instead of the intermediation approach to model the 
relationship between inputs and outputs in banks; this amounts to using deposits as a measure of output 
together with loans. The assumption that banks consume inputs (i.e., labour and IT services) to obtain 
deposits (output) is realistic in the evaluation of the productivity of banks at the branch level and in the 
aggregate. Other papers that use the sum of loans and deposits as a measure of single output of banks are 
Humphrey (1992), Prasad and Harker, (1997), Tirtiroglu, Daniels, and Tirtiroglu (2005). A different issue 
is how banking services tied to lending and those tied to the deposits combine to give a measure of total 
bank output. 
7 We formally test this assumption and find empirical evidence supporting it.  
,)( ααω −=+ 1f IKNeDL (3)
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 12 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1239
where )(ωfe  is the total factor productivity term of the production function, which is 
increasing with the productivity shock Ȧ.  
Estimation of the production function: Methodology 
The estimation of the parameters of production function (3) follows the 
methodology proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996) and extended by Levinsohn and 
Petrin (2003). In both cases the concern is to correct for the endogenous bias in the 
estimation of the elasticity of output with respect to labor and capital caused by the fact 
that the quantity of labor input used in production may itself be determined by the value 
of the productivity shock.  
The estimation procedure, adapted to this particular case, proceeds as follows. Let  
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
itititkitnit ikny εωβββ ++++= 0
be the log-transformation of the production function in (3) where ε  is a the pure 
stochastic component. The term ω is a state variable in the firm decision problem and, 
therefore, it affects the demand for inputs. This variable is observable to the firm’s 
manager but not to econometricians. We do not impose the condition of constant returns 
to scale, which will be empirically tested.  
Let the variable τ be one observable variable that depends on the two state 
variables ω and ik. This proxy variable τ is required to be monotonic in ω for all the 
values of ik so as it is possible to invert the function and yield ω as a function of τ and 
the level of capital ik8
( )itittit ikh ,τω =
By replacing this expression of the productivity in (5) it is possible therefore to control 
for ω in the estimation of 
where ( ) ( )itittitik0ititt ikhikik ,, τββτϕ ++≡ . Subtracting the expectation of (5) conditional 
on (τιt, ikιt) from (5) we obtain 
                                                
8 Olley and Pakes (1996) propose to use capital investment as proxy variable τ. Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003) extend the list of observable variables correlated with the productivity shock that can be used in 
the estimation procedure to eliminate the potential estimation bias. They argue that adjustment costs could 
imply that firms decide not to invest even though the productivity shock exists. To overcome this 
limitation they propose to use intermediate inputs as proxy variables of productivity shocks.  
( ) ititittitnit ikny ετϕβ ++= ,
( ) ( )( ) itititititnitititit iknEnikyEy ετβτ +−=− ,|,| .
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This equation can be estimated using the non-parametric approach proposed by 
Levinsohn-Petrin that consists on, first, estimating the conditional moments ( )ttt ikyE ,|τ
and ( )ttt iknE ,|τ  using a locally weighted quadratic least squares approximation and, 
then, using non-intercept OLS to obtain a consistent estimate of βn9.  
Parameter βik associated to IT capital is estimated in a second stage. It begins 
with the assumption that productivity tω  follows a first-order Markov process, 
( ) it1ititit E ξωωω += −|
where itξ  is the innovation term. Following Olley-Pakes, βik is identified by assuming 
that neither IT capital nor the lagged number of workers respond to the innovation in 
productivity. Function ( )1| −ttE ωω  can be estimated by locally weighted least squares 
relying on the estimations of ωt and ωt-1 obtained from the first-stage results and one 
candidate value for the coefficient associated to IT capital denoted as *ikβ . Thus, for a 
given candidate value, parameter βik can be estimated from the following equation 
[ ] ( )*|ˆˆ ititititik1itititnit ikEny βεξβωωβ ++=−− − ,
where the residuals are expressed in terms of the candidate *ikβ . Let define a set of 
orthogonality conditions  
( )( ) 0')( =+=Λ itititzEE εξ , 
where zt is a vector that includes {ikt, ikt-1, nt-1}. Then, ikβˆ  is estimated by minimizing 
the GMM criterion function defined from the orthogonal conditions of the population: 
( ) ¦
=
Λ⋅Λ=
H
h
Q
1
*** )(')('min
*
βββ
β
where h indexes the H instruments. To measure the precision of our estimates, we use 
bootstrapped standard errors of the coefficients.10 Finally, the GMM estimator of ikβ  is 
chosen for a grid search as in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) since this is more robust than 
using starting candidate value *ikβ  (as for example the OLS estimator).  
                                                
9 Alternatively, parameter nβ  in Equation (5) can be estimated using OLS including some approximation 
for function ϕt(.). Olley and Pakes approximate this function with a polynomial expansion in τt and ikt
10 Petrin, Poi and Levinsohn. (2004) provide an estimation command that implements this methodology in 
Stata. This command allows the estimation of production function using one or two proxies of 
productivity and one variable of capital (non-variable inputs). In this paper we will need the inclusion of 
two variables of capital, i.e. branches and IT capital. 
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Database and variables 
We draw bank-level data from the non-consolidated confidential balance sheets and 
income statements, as well as in complementary files, reported by banks to Banco de 
España. The sample period spans from 1992 to 2007 and contains information of 
commercial and savings banks. We exclude credit cooperatives because they do not 
provide all the information that is needed in the analysis, as well as banks whose market 
share of assets is smaller than 0.1%. When two banks merge, we consider that a new 
bank brand is created. Banks considered in our paper represent 89.25% of the Spanish 
banking industry, in terms of assets, in 2007. This coverage is similar in terms of other 
variables, such as the number of employees and remains fairly stable across time period. 
We consider three different inputs that enter into the production of banking 
services: (i) the input services from the physical capital (i.e. number of branches of a 
given capacity), (ii) the services from IT capital and (iii) the services from workers.  
The fixed capacity per branch of bank i, qi, is obtained dividing the replacement 
cost of its buildings by the number of owned branches (i.e. we assume homogeneous 
branches for each bank). The total capacity of the bank is equal to Biqi, where Bi is the 
total number of branches (owned and rented) of bank i.  
Banks report a stock of IT capital in the assets side of the balance sheet and they 
also report an annual flow of IT expenditures in the income statement. We define the 
stock of the IT capital of bank i in year t, IKit as the sum of the IT capital in the balance 
sheet at book value plus the estimated capital stock accumulated from annual 
expenditures assuming a perpetual inventory model with depreciation rate of 35%. In 
the calculation of the stock of IT capital at replacement cost, we assume that 
incorporated technical progress practically compensates the price inflation11. Finally, 
the labor input services of bank i in year t, Nit is measured as the average number of 
employees of bank i during year t.  
The output of the banking firm is approximated by the sum of loans and 
deposits. The balance of loans and deposits in year t are calculated at homogeneous 
current prices applying the permanent inventory model. Following this scheme, the 
estimated stock of deposits (loans) in year t is equal to the deposits (loans) in t-1 valued 
at year t prices using the general inflation price index plus the flow of new deposits 
                                                
11 Martín-Oliver, Salas-Fumás and Saurina (2007) explains in detail the methodology used in the 
calculation of physical and IT capital of Spanish banks.  
3. The productivity estimation for Spanish banks  
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(loans) in year t. After their estimation at current prices, all inputs and outputs in 
monetary units are deflated and expressed in prices of year 1992.  
Table 1 presents the time evolution of the descriptive statistics of the inputs, 
outputs and number of braches per bank. The data shows that the number of banks in 
the Spanish industry over time has fallen from 140, in 1992, to 90, in 2007. For the rest 
of variables of the table, the mean is substantially above the median indicating that the 
distribution of the variable is highly skewed. The growth rate of the average number of 
employees per bank is smaller than minus the growth rate of the number of banks, 
which implies that the total number of industry employees decreases in the period. On 
the other hand, the stock of IT capital increases over time. This suggests that labor is 
substituted by IT capital in the input mix of banks. More concretely, the average stock 
of IT capital per employee has increased 68% during the sample period. The average 
rates of growth of output per bank and IT per bank where similar (around 7.7% of 
average annual growth rate) and much higher than the growth rate in the average 
number of workers per bank (around 1.5%). This implies an important increase in labor 
productivity along the period (around 130% in 2007 compared with 1992), as well as an 
increase in the total factor productivity of banks.  
Estimation of the production function  
The estimates of the parameters of the production function are presented in Table 2. The 
upper part of the table shows the estimates of the parameters of the production 
technology, equation (4), ignoring the simultaneity bias (i.e. OLS). The lower part 
reports the estimates controlling for the simultaneity between efficiency shocks and 
labour input decisions, using investment in IT as a proxy for the productivity shocks (in 
line with Olley and Pakes, 1996).  
The use of the investment in IT capital as the proxy variable τ has been decided 
after comparing the results with those obtained with other alternatives, mainly 
externally supplied intermediate inputs, in line with Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 12
(bellow, we discuss robustness checks in more detail). In banking firms, the link 
between the productivity shocks and the external purchases of intermediate inputs may 
                                                
12 The main reason why Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) posited intermediate inputs as an alternative proxy 
to investment in capital is the existence of adjustment costs that could result in firms that do not invest in 
some periods. It would imply a large proportion of zero-investment observations in the sample that could 
not be used in the estimations. In our application, all banks in the sample invest a positive amount in IT 
during all the years of the period. 
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be weaker than in industrial firms because in banks the elasticity of output to variations 
in the inputs is expected to be small compared with that in industrial firms. In addition, 
investment in IT was the variable that better fitted the three specification tests posited 
by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) in the selection of the proxy variable: i) monotonicity, 
i.e. higher levels of investments are associated to higher values of the productivity for 
any level of IT capital (see Figure A1 in the Appendix A); ii) correction of the bias: the 
estimated coefficient of labour (IT capital) is lower (higher) in the correction of 
simultaneity than in the OLS estimation, as expected; and finally iii) orthogonality of 
the freely variable input (labour, in this case) and the innovation in productivity in t+1 
(the estimated correlation (-2.07%) is not significant at 10%). 
The two columns in the left-hand side of Table 2 correspond to the estimation 
when the constant returns to scale condition at the bank level is not imposed. The total 
inputs of each bank are written as the product of inputs per branch times the number of 
branches. In this specification, the hypothesis of constant returns to scale at the bank 
level is satisfied if the coefficient associated to (the log of) the number of branches is 
equal to 1. The right-hand side panel exhibits the estimation results when the constant 
returns to scale condition at the bank level is imposed: inputs and outputs are all defined 
at the bank level and the number of branches is excluded from the right-hand side of the 
equation. p-values associated to the nulls of constant returns to scale at the bank level 
(i.e. H0: the coefficient associated to the number of branches (in logs) equals 1) and at 
the branch level (i.e. H0: ȕn + ȕik = 1) are reported. 
Considering OLS estimation results reported in the upper part of Table 2, the 
null hypothesis of constant returns to scale can be rejected at both, bank and branch 
level. The respective estimates of the elasticity of output with respect to labour and IT 
capital are, approximately, 0.69 and 0.22 and the coefficient of ln(branches) is 0.91. 
Therefore, the estimation using OLS would imply that the production technology of 
banks, both at the bank and at the branch level, has decreasing returns to scale. Results 
are different when the estimation is performed taking into account the potential 
simultaneity between the firm’s input decisions and its productivity using IT investment 
as a proxy of productivity (lower part of Table 2). Now, the null hypotheses of constant 
returns to scale at the bank level and at branch level cannot be rejected at any standard 
significance level. Results confirm the presence of simultaneity bias since, compared to 
the Levinsohn-Petrin estimations, OLS coefficients over-estimate the elasticity of the 
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output to the labour input and an under-estimate the elasticity of the output to the IT 
capital.  
If the null hypothesis of constant returns at the bank level is imposed, the estimated 
elasticity of output to labour and IT capital are 0.501 and 0.421, respectively (compared 
to 0.696 and 0.207). This elasticity of output to IT capital implies that if the stock of IT 
capital per employee doubles then the output per worker (labour productivity) increases 
by 42.1%. In period 1993-2007, the stock of IT per employee has increased from 10.2 to 
16.7 thousands of Euros (64 %). Therefore, deepening of IT capital has increased labour 
productivity of Spanish banks in 26.9% (0.421 multiplied by 64) from 1993-2007. 
Robustness tests 
The estimates of the production function using different definitions of intermediate 
inputs (expenses on electricity and other supplies, on office stationary, on external 
administrative services and on total operating costs) as alternative proxies of the 
productivity are reported in Table A1 of Appendix A. As explained above, our final 
choice has been investment in IT capital because the potential candidates did not fulfil 
the minimum requirements stated by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). First, the use of 
external administrative services, in spite of providing similar results than IT investment, 
implied the drastic reduction of the sample because of the lack of information (this 
variable was only available since 1999). Next, neither total operating expenditures nor 
office stationary (and, to a lesser extent, electricity supply) satisfied the monotonic 
condition for low levels of IT capital: Figure B1 shows a decline or stagnation of the 
productivity for high levels of IT capital when the intermediate input increases. As well, 
all the proxy candidates failed in the condition of absence of correlation between labour 
and the productivity shock of t+1, with the exception of external administrative services
(-5.3%, non significant at 10%). These reasons may explain why electricity and other 
supplies returned similar estimates than investment in IT capital, but with decreasing 
returns to scale at the branch level (against the findings of Martín-Oliver and Salas-
Fumás, 2008) and why office stationary and operating expenses provided estimated 
elasticity of the output to the inputs that were too low compared to the rest of estimates 
(labour is below 0.3 and that IT capital is even smaller than in OLS). 
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the contribution of inputs to the output. In particular, we have estimated the production 
functions (both at bank level and at branch level) distinguishing among three sub-
periods: 1992-1997, 1998-2002 and 2003-2007. Differences among estimated 
coefficients corresponding to different periods are not statistically significant. 
Therefore, we present only the estimates of the whole sample period and focus on these 
coefficients to measure and further analyze the productivity level of Spanish banks. 
Productivity in the banking industry 
Using the estimations of the elasticity parameters reported in Table 2 of the production 
function in Equation (5), the productivity level of bank i in year t, denoted as pit, can be 
estimated as:13 itititit IK4210N5010DLp ln.ln.)ln(ln −−+= . Then, relying on the bank-
level productivity estimates, we construct the indicator of industry wide average 
productivity as the weighted average of the banks’ productivity using the shares of the 
banks in terms of output as weights. Olley and Pakes (1996) distinguish between two 
sources that may explain the evolution of the industry productivity. On the one hand, 
the evolution of the (un-weighted) average productivity of the firms in the industry and, 
on the other hand, a term that captures the differences in productivity that are associated 
with the size of the bank:  
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where tp  is the industry productivity at time t, its  is the share of bank i at t and its  and 
itp are the un-weighted means of bank’s productivity and output shares, respectively. A 
positive (negative) value of the second term of the right hand side indicates that larger 
banks tend to be more (less) productive than smaller ones.14
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the industry productivity (pt) and its two 
components. The productivity of the banking industry has shown an increasing trend 
over the whole time period that is attributable to both, productivity gains of the average 
bank, and to a positive reallocation effect. The facts that bigger entities have been more 
                                                
13 As in Olley and Pakes (1996), Nakane and Weintraub (2005) and Buch, Koch and Kötter (2009), we 
estimate the productivity as a residual from the difference between the observed and the predicted output 
of the bank in time period t, not the productive efficiency (distance to an efficient frontier) to be 
consistent with the general methodology. Implicit along the paper is also the assumption that the elasticity 
of output with respect to labor and IT capital are the same for banks of different characteristics; in other 
words, the heterogeneity of banks only affects the constant of the production function.  
14 For a similar decomposition applied to Spanish manufacturing industry see Fariñas and Ruano (2004).  
Finally, following Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), we estimate the production 
function for different time periods to allow for variation in the coefficients that measure 
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productive and have increased their output share in the industry results in a higher 
growth rate of the average industry productivity, compared to the situation where all the 
banks had been equally productive. This reallocation effect is clearly manifested after 
the years 1999-2000, when two different mergers (Banco Santander-Central Hispano 
and BBV-Argentaria) gave rise to the two biggest banks of the Spanish banking system, 
increasing the contribution of the size effect to the productivity of the industry. 
Focusing on the evolution of the productivity of the Spanish banking industry, 
Figures 2A and 2B shows the annual and the cumulative growth rates of the estimated 
banking industry productivity pt, respectively. The weighted average productivity in 
2007 is 2.8 times the value in 1993, which implies an increase of 180% during the 15 
years period (Figure 2B). Most of the increase in the aggregate productivity occurs in 
the second part of the period (2000-2007), when the average annual rate of growth was 
10.01%, compared to the 3.85% average annual rate during the 1992-1999 period 
(Figure 2A). 
4. What is behind the observed productivity? 
Our measure of productivity for each bank and year is the residual obtained from the 
difference between the actual output of the bank (loans plus deposits) minus the output 
predicted from the quantities of labor and IT capital. One of the determinants of the 
productivity differences which matters most for welfare analysis is the underlying 
differential in intermediation efficiency. We measure the intermediation efficiency of 
the banking industry as the Hicks-neutral technological progress that determines the 
time trend in productivity, after removing other sources of cross-section and time 
variability from the pooled data of banks’ productivity. Among these other sources of 
productivity differences, we particularly focus on the changes in the balance sheet of 
banks that have been pinpointed as potential factors of the outburst of the financial 
crisis: increasing risk taking, excessive growth and higher illiquidity risk.  
In this section we first document the changes in the assets and liabilities of 
Spanish banks that preceded the financial crisis. Next, we hypothesize how these 
changes may have affected the estimated productivity of banks. Finally, we estimate an 
empirical model on determinants of banks’ productivity for the double purpose of 
testing the hypotheses and estimating the residual technical progress in the banking 
industry.  
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4.1. The behavior of Spanish banks in the pre-crisis period 
The situation of Spanish banks in the pre-crisis period can be summarized as follows: i) 
Spain joined the Euro zone benefiting from low interest rates and financial integration 
when monetary policies by Central Banks around the world, including the ECB, were 
extremely accommodative; ii) prices and demand of real estate-related assets, including 
houses, experienced a high increase and banks provided the credit to fund this 
expansion; iii) Spanish banks used a combination of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) 
and short-term funding to finance the lending to real estate developers and house 
buyers; iv) banks were able to comply with regulatory capital and sustain the high level 
of credit growth by issuing hybrid financial products, cheaper than pure equity. The 
behavior of Spanish banks during these years is close to what Diamond and Rajan 
(2009) describe as “proximate causes of the crisis”.15. Table 3 shows how this situation 
was translated into important changes in the banks’ balance sheets. We present the mean 
and median values of variables that capture the mortgage and real-estate lending 
activity, the securitization intensity, the importance of short-term finance and the equity 
capital ratio (inverse of leverage) of Spanish banks in three successive time periods: the 
pre-Euro years of 1993-1997, the consolidation period of 1998-2002, and the period of 
high growth, 2003-2007. A more complete definition of each variable can be found in 
Appendix B.  
According to Table 3, the average proportion of real estate loans increased over 
time from 12.7% in 1993-97 to 21.0% in 2003-2007, while the proportion of mortgages 
rose from 32.1% of all loans to 51.8%, confirming the expansion of the lending activity 
in real estate and housing markets after Spain joined the Euro zone. During the years 
previous to the Euro, Spanish banks did not participate in securitization activities, but 
afterwards the number of banks issuing MBS increased steadily: in the period 2003-
2007 these securities represent 15.2 % of the total assets for the banks that issue them.  
The maturity of the wholesale finance for the banks that get funds from these 
markets is measured by the weighted maturity of wholesale financing (variable 
Duration), and by the net position of banks in the interbank market. The mean value of 
Duration increased over time, indicating that Spanish banks issued securities of longer 
                                                
15 Regulatory arbitrage through securitization (Achayra, Schuabl, Suarez 2011) was not possible among 
Spanish banks. Banking regulation forced banks to keep the issued securities in their balance sheet unless 
banks were effectively transferring the risk out of the bank, which did not happen in most of the cases 
(banks kept worse tranches or granted credit enhancements). Thus, securitized and non-securitized loans 
had the same impact in terms of regulatory capital requirements. 
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maturity in wholesale markets at the same time that the weight of long-term loans in 
real estate and housing was also increasing. Banks’ liquidity position was then 
maintained from this point of view. However, Spanish banks increased their dependence 
on interbank finance over time, both in terms of a larger number of banks with a net 
borrowing position in the interbank market (variable IdB), and in terms of a higher 
value of the ratio of borrowing over lending in this market (variable ÂIB borrow/IB 
lend). Comparing the time periods 1992-1997 and 2003-2007, the proportion of banks 
with a net borrowing position grew from 20.6% to 53.2% and the ratio of the amount 
borrowed and the amount lent in the interbank rose from 0.86 to 2.56, respectively. 
Finally, Table 3 shows a decreasing trend in the equity capital ratio during the 
1990’s and a drop of the ratio from 9.9% in the period 1998-2002, to 6.8% in the period 
2003-2007. However, the regulatory capital ratio stayed relatively stable during this 
time period (16.15% in 1998-2002 and 14.29% in 2003-2007), which means that 
regulatory capital requirements derived from the high growth of the years 2003-2007 
were fulfilled with debt-like instruments.   
4.2. Implications for productivity and productivity growth 
We now explain why these changes in the balance sheet of banks can have positive 
effects on productivity and productivity growth over time.   
Real estate and mortgage loans. We identify two reasons why the concentration of 
loans in real estate and mortgages can have positive effects on productivity: lower 
screening and higher loan-to-value ratios. 
On the one hand, the incentives of banks for screening the credit quality of the 
borrower in collateralized loans are milder than in loans without collateral (Manove, 
Padilla and Pagano 2001). Mortgages and real estate loans are collateralized so lower 
screening will imply more loans granted (or produced) per employee. During the years 
previous to the crisis screening incentives might have been even milder because the 
escalation in house and real estate prices was perceived as an additional guarantee for 
lenders.  
On the other hand, the expectation of permanent increase in house prices could 
have inclined bank managers to grant loans with higher loan-to-value ratios than in 
periods with flatter expectations. This higher loan-to-value ratio per average loan can be 
translated to higher productivity since, with the same amount of inputs, banks can 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 22 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1239
produce a higher balance of loans due to the higher average size of the loans granted. 
Therefore, our first hypothesis can be stated as follows: 
Securitization. We expect that banks that traditionally financed their loans with 
deposits and, at some point in time, start to obtain finance issuing securities backed with 
loans will experience an increase in productivity for reasons related with changes in the 
business model rather than with technical progress.  
In traditional banking there is a relationship between the use of inputs (labor and 
IT capital) and the total output of banks in such a way that an increment of the bank’s 
output (loans plus deposits) has to be accompanied by an increase in the use of inputs. 
However, in the “originate to securitize” model, banks have become “intermediaries”, 
not “producers” of deposits and loans.  The issuance of MBS provided Spanish banks 
with funds to grant loans directly from the market and outside the network of branches. 
Therefore, banks obtain funds to grant new loans without opening new branches and/or 
increasing the use of inputs in old and new ones, something that they could not do if 
they were to obtain funds from deposits. 
Securitization also changed lending practices by banks. The creditworthiness of 
securitized loans was based on the qualifications of rating agencies and not so much on 
the detailed soft information collected by bank officers. These agencies did not have 
close information about the beneficiary of the loan (homeowner, for example), so they 
could process only hard information such as the credit score of the borrower and the 
loan-to-value ratio. As a consequence, bank officers stopped collecting this information 
and focused only on lending to borrowers that could have good credit scores and 
observable adequate loan-to-value ratios (Diamond and Rajan 2009). Collecting the 
useful soft information on the credit quality of the borrowers was more time consuming 
than collecting the hard information of the credit score. This is another reason why 
issuing MBS banks might have increased the ratio of output relative to inputs. 
Short-term wholesale funding. Securitization was not the only way banks had to 
raise funds in financial markets. Under the umbrella of the Euro, Spanish banks became 
net borrowers in the interbank market and they issued bonds and other debt instruments 
to fill the gap between loans and deposits.  
Ideally, long-term loans should have been financed with long-term debt 
instruments but it is well known that, under the expectation of future low interest rates, 
leveraged banks have incentives to finance with short-term debt, becoming more 
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illiquid (Diamond and Rajan, 2009b). Moreover, investors were keen to provide banks 
with short-term finance because it facilitated the option to exit if things went wrong and 
banks got into trouble (Diamond and Rajan, 2001). Spanish banks were probably 
affected by these incentives and took advantage of the cheaper and practically unlimited 
short-term finance through the interbank and the financial markets. Then, it can be 
expected that banks tended to adopt a financial structure more oriented to short-term 
leverage, even though their loans had a long-term maturity. 
Regulatory capital and leverage ratio. Regulatory capital standards are intended 
to restrain the growth of bank credit and limit the leverage ratios, preventing excessive 
risk taking (Kim and Santomero, 1988; Rochet, 1992; Morrison and White, 2005). Over 
the years leading up to the financial crisis, there is evidence that banks changed the 
composition of their regulatory capital to a higher proportion of subordinate debt and 
preferred stocks (Acharya and Schnabl, 2009; Acharya, Gujral and Shin,(2012): 
Khorana and Perlman, 2010).  
The high credit growth rates of loans among Spanish banks together with stable 
dividend policies increased the regulatory capital requirements above the retained 
earnings. In order to comply with capital requirements, banks issued hybrid instruments 
instead of issuing equity16 because the former were less costly (i.e., interests of hybrid 
instruments were tax deductible). As a result, we could observe the apparent paradox of 
banks keeping their regulatory capital ratio at constant levels while they were becoming 
more leveraged, since the regulatory requirements were fulfilled with debt-like 
instruments. 
4.3. Empirical model on the determinants of banking productivity 
The full econometric model on determinants of productivity differences of banks is 
formulated as follows: 
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The dependent variable is the log of productivity of bank i in year t obtained as a 
residual, as explained above. There are three sets of explanatory variables. The first one, 
j
itx , includes the variables in Table 3 that account for the presumed positive effect on 
productivity due to credit growth in real estate and mortgages, securitization, short term 
                                                
16 Savings banks do not have equity in their balance sheet, so they cannot issue common shares. 
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finance and leverage. The second block, jitz , correspond to control variables such as 
ownership, market scope, size, quality of inputs, priced services, growth, merger 
activity, risk and so on, which have been found relevant in explaining productivity 
differences among banks in previous studies (Berger and Mester, 1997; Frei, Harker and 
Hunter, 2000, Carbó, Humphrey and López del Paso, 2007). The precise definition of 
each of these variables appears in Appendix B and the descriptive statistics in Table 4. 
The third block of explanatory variables is the time dummy variables dt, equal to1 when 
the observation belongs to year t and zero otherwise. The parameters associated to the 
time-dummy variables, șt, capture the time effects on productivity common to all banks 
in the industry. We estimate a variation of model (7) where the time-dummy variables 
are replaced by macroeconomic variables of the Spanish economy (i.e., inflation, 
interest rates and business cycle) together with a time trend variable. In this 
specification, the coefficient of the time trend variable will be our estimate of the 
industry technical progress. Finally, νit is the random error term.  
The model is estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at bank level 
and the results are presented in Table 5. Specification I shows the results of estimating 
the model as it is formulated in [7], whereas in Specification II shows the time dummy 
variables are substituted by macroeconomic variables (growth of GDP, inflation and 
interbank interest rate) and the trend variable. The estimated coefficients of the 
common variables in both specifications are similar in magnitude and statistical 
significance. 
Productivity and proximate causes of the crisis 
Our estimation results confirm that the differences in the observed productivity of banks 
can be explained, to a large extent, by the changes in the assets composition of banks 
documented in Table 3 and related to “proximate causes” of the crisis. As expected, the 
proportion of real estate and mortgages in the loans portfolio of banks is positively 
correlated with productivity. This result confirms the hypothesis that the specialisation 
in this type of products in the pre-crisis period can explain part of the observed increase 
in gross productivity of banks over time. The coefficient of the variable proportion of 
securitized assets is also positive and statistically significant, confirming that generate-
to-securitize is more productive in terms of labour and IT capital services consumed 
than traditional banking. The negative coefficient of the variable Deposits/Loans is 
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coherent with this result, although it is not statistically significant once we control for 
the other finance instruments. 
The explanatory variables on short-term sources of funds that finance the gap 
between loans and deposits are also positively related with banks productivity. The 
estimated coefficient of the variable IdBÂIBborrow/IB lend is positive and statistically 
significant at 1%, which implies that the higher the net borrowing position in interbank 
markets is, the higher is the bank productivity level17. The rest of the coefficients related 
to short-term finance are non-significant (maturity of wholesale finance and the dummy 
indicating whether or not the bank maintains a net borrowing position in interbank 
market). Therefore what matters for productivity is the net lending position in the 
interbank market, not the net borrowing one. Finally, the estimated coefficient of the 
equity capital ratio is negative and statistically significant. More leveraged banks have 
higher productivity than the less leveraged ones because the latter were expanding their 
balance sheets with non-core capital instruments. Nonetheless, these banks managed to 
keep their regulatory capital ratios relatively constant over time (see Table 3) because 
they issued hybrid and debt-like instruments that counted as regulatory capital. 
Therefore, the positive effect of leverage on banks’ productivity is due to the increase of 
leverage within regulatory capital, that is, the increasing weight of hybrid instruments in 
detriment of core capital. 
Control variables 
Ownership, size and market scope of banks affect banks’ productivity. Saving banks are 
25% less productive than commercial banks, while foreign subsidiaries are almost 20% 
more productive than national commercial banks18. Size of the banks has a positive 
effect on productivity, as well as concentration in local and regional markets. 
Productivity of banks also varies with the quality of the productive inputs. The positive 
association between the average salaries of banks and their productivity suggests that 
higher salaries go together with more productive workers. Next, the positive (although 
not statistically significant) coefficient of human capital from training and the negative 
coefficient of the proportion of temporary employees point also to a positive effect of 
                                                
17 On the contrary, the coefficients associated to lending position in the interbank market are not 
significant. 
18 Berger (2007) reviews the literature on productivity comparisons between foreign subsidiaries and 
national banks; broadly, foreign subsidiaries tend to be more productive than national banks. The results 
of the comparison may be affected by differences in the portfolio of services and markets served by each 
group of banks. 
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human capital on bank’s productivity. Finally, a higher proportion of advertising capital 
in the total operating capital of banks has also a positive effect on productivity.  
Banks collecting more revenues in the form of net commissions (relative to total 
assets) are less productive, possibly because commissions are associated with services 
that banks provide to their customers and these services are not properly captured by the 
output measurement used in this paper. Since the inputs (labour and capital services) 
involved to produce these services are effectively accounted for, we obtain that banks 
with a business profile more oriented to services that charge commissions are penalized 
in our productivity measure 19. Table 5 also shows that a higher annual growth rate in 
the number of branches has a negative effect on productivity, possibly because of 
inputs’ indivisibilities and lower occupation rate of existing branches’ capacity. Next, 
we find that the organization of banking activities also matters for productivity. On the 
one side, the use of the internet channel has significant positive effects on banks 
productivity and, on the other side the effect of geographic diversification (proportion of 
overseas branches) also contributes in a significantly positive manner to productivity. 
However, the proportion of employees in branches (and less in headquarters) and the 
size of the branch do not have significant effects on productivity. Finally, the 
involvement of banks in mergers or acquisitions and the relative loan loss provisions (as 
indicator of risk) do not have any significant effect on productivity.  
The estimated coefficients of the macro variables included in Specification II 
show that the inflation (measured as the growth of the consumer price index) has a 
negative effect on productivity and the interbank interest rate a positive one, whereas 
the GDP growth rate does not affect productivity.  
Technical progress 
The estimates of the dummy variables (not reported) in Specification I and the 
coefficient of the trend in Specification II provide a measure of technical progress, that 
is, productivity growth once we have accounted for other sources of heterogeneity. 
In Specification I, the values of the estimated coefficients of the time dummies 
imply an average annual growth of 3.17% in the pre-Euro period (1993-1999) and of 
                                                
19 We compute the net present value of the flow of commissions assuming a permanent annual flow equal 
to the current value of the net commissions using as discount factor the current value of the 12-month 
Interbank interest rate. When we recalculate the productivity measure and estimate the parameters in 
model (7), the variable commissions over total assets is no longer statistically significant, what would 
confirm our interpretation of the results. 
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3.26% in the post-Euro period. This estimate of productivity growth in the post Euro 
period is much lower than the gross 10% growth rate estimated without controlling for 
the sources of productivity differences considered in (7). These results also show that 
the trend in adjusted productivity growth in the pre-Euro period is maintained in the 
post-Euro period, that is, there are no differences in growth as those observed in gross 
productivity (Figure 2A) 
Specification II intends to isolate technical progress from macroeconomic 
shocks in the adjusted time trend of industry productivity. The estimated coefficient of 
the time trend variable is positive and statistically significant with a value of 0.028. 
Therefore, our estimate of the banking industry growth in technical progress is 2.8% per 
year in this specification. The difference with respect to the time trend of 3.2% in 
Specification I can be attributed to macroeconomic shocks different from technical 
progress on the productivity of banks. Finally, if we include the interaction of the trend 
with a dummy identifying the years of the Euro in Specification II, this variable is non-
statistically significant. This implies that the technical progress grew at the same pace 
before and after the introduction of the Euro, as we have found from the results of 
Specification I. 
Figure 3 completes the productivity decomposition exercise by explaining the 
main factors contributing to the change from the “gross” to the “net” estimated 
productivity trend for the Spanish banking industry. The calculations to decompose the 
aggregate cumulative productivity growth are done using the (average) cumulative 
change of every explanatory variable and its estimated coefficient from Specification 
I.20 Mortgages and real estate, securitization, leverage and net borrowing interbank 
position account for the largest share of productivity gap between the “gross” and the 
“net” time trend in productivity. 
From these results, the conclusion must be that the extraordinary growth in 
aggregate productivity in the Spanish banking industry during the years after Spain 
joined the Euro zone cannot be attributed to a higher growth rate in technical progress. 
Rather, the reason must be found in the new monetary conditions faced by Spanish 
banks in the Euro, which made easier the access of banks to financial markets: Banks 
obtained funds (securitization, interbank market,...) that were used to finance the 
                                                
20 More precisely, the contribution of variable j to the cumulative growth of productivity in year t=1992+s
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booming real estate demand market (mortgages). In addition to this practice, banks 
increased their financial leverage probably to compensate the lower commercial 
margins in a context of historically low interbank rates.  
Robustness exercises  
For robustness purposes, we have re-estimated the productivity growth attributed to 
technical change in the pre- and post- Euro period, starting with the re-estimation of the 
production function using alternative measures of output. First, we estimated the loans 
at constant prices using a price index for each bank that takes into account the 
differences in prices of real estate assets compared with the general inflation rate of the 
Spanish economy, as well as the different proportion of real estate loans granted by each 
bank. In this way, we correct for the over-estimation of the output in the second part of 
the period when inflation of real estate assets was higher. The basic results remain 
unchanged while the minimum differences in Specification I between the estimated 
average rate of technical progress in the pre-and the post-Euro period disappear (now, 
3.3% in the two periods). Second, we construct a measure of output that is equal to a 
weighted geometric average of loans and deposits (with weights 0.4 and 0.6, 
respectively, which are the coefficients of an estimation of the cost function) as an 
alternative to the sum of loans and deposits. The main results do not change at all and, 
again, the differences in the average growth rate of technical progress for the two 
periods disappear.  
Another robustness exercise has explored the estimation of the determinants of 
productivity (Table 5) using fixed effects, to check whether there is unobservable 
heterogeneity that is biasing the estimates. The results21 show that the sign of the 
coefficients remains unchanged, as well as the magnitude, suggesting that the (long) list 
of explanatory variables included in the regressions capture relatively well the 
differences across banks and there is no relevant missing information that is biasing the 
results. Nonetheless, the significance in some coefficients has decreased or even 
become non-significant (for example salaries) what could be expected because the 
fixed-effect estimation drops out the cross-section variability and the coefficients are 
estimated less efficiently. 
                                                
21 Results not shown in the paper. Available from the authors  upon request. 
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In the Spanish banking industry the saving banks have significantly different 
ownership and governance characteristics compared with commercial banks. The 
empirical evidence reported in Table 5 shows that saving banks are on average less 
productive than commercial banks. We have examined if this difference in productivity 
has been stable over time. To do so, we generalize Specification I of Table 5 including 
as additional explanatory variable the interaction between the dummy variable Savings
and the time dummy variables. None of the estimated coefficients for the cross-product 
of savings and time variables are statistically significant. Thus, no difference in the 
technical progress is observed between commercial and saving banks.   
5. Conclusion 
Efficient financial intermediation is a key factor for economic development. The high 
productivity growth in the banking industry around the world until 2008 anticipated a 
period of prosperity and wealth creation. However, the outburst of the financial crisis 
revealed that these expectations were totally erroneous. Conventional measures of 
banks’ productivity growth as a proxy for efficiency gains in financial intermediation 
have been questioned, and new developments are needed to properly asses the technical 
progress of the banking industry. This paper contributes to this development in two 
ways: First, with a new methodology in the measurement of productivity of banks and, 
second, with the measurement of the component of the industry productivity growth 
attributed to technical progress.  
From the methodological point of view, the paper introduces a Leontief 
production function for banks with IT capital as one of the inputs and it is estimated 
following the procedure posited in Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003) to control for the simultaneity bias between labour and productivity. These 
methodological advances have clear implications for policy analysis and productivity 
estimations of banks: First, the results obtained from the estimation of the production 
function cannot reject the null hypothesis of constant returns to scale (rejected in OLS); 
the return to scale properties of the production function is a key factor in mergers and 
restructuring decisions. Second, the estimated elasticity of the output of banks from IT 
capital services is twice the elasticity estimated using OLS. As this elasticity enters into 
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find that the cumulative growth in IT capital per employee increased output per 
employee in 27% during the sample period (1.6% cumulative annual growth), revealing 
the high contribution of IT capital in the banking industry. Overall, the average annual 
cumulative growth rate in labour productivity was 4.4% during the sample period (1.6% 
of IT capital contribution plus 2.8% of technical progress). 
As for the measurement of the industry’s technical progress, we find that 
Spanish banks participated of many of the causes that lead to the financial crisis after 
Spain joined the EMU. More than two thirds of the reported growth in banks’ 
productivity was at the expense of fuelling a housing and real estate credit bubble, 
creating a liquidity gap between loans and deposits financed with MBS and with 
interbank loans and increasing financial leverage. This occurred at the same time that 
the industry maintained a steady annual growth rate in technical progress of 2.8%, 
similar to the rate in the pre Euro period.  
More research is needed to advance in the knowledge on how to reconcile 
productivity estimates of individual banks with systemic measures of financial stability. 
We believe that our approach offers a promising start. Haldane, Brennan and Madouros 
(2010) propose using risk-free measures of output for banks in the calculations of 
productivity growth of banks within the KLEMS project22. One difficulty of this 
approach is how to obtain the appropriate price for risk. Our approach relies on 
quantities and does not require information on prices, a clear advantage taking into 
account the market failures affecting the pricing of risk. 
the calculation of the contribution of IT to labour productivity growth, the estimated 
contribution of IT capital deepening to labour productivity growth using the OLS would 
have been half of what it really is. Using the estimates controlling for simultaneity, we 
                                                
22 The KLEMS-project serves as an international platform, coordinated by the EU, in which national 
research and data collection efforts are supported and co-ordinated to create a database on measures of 
economic growth, productivity, employment creation, capital formation and technological change at the 
industry level with a clear emphasis on the need for international comparability.
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